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Introduction 
A Google search for the phrase ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ in April 2009 yielded 
almost 10,000 hits, indicating that it has indeed struck a cord, probably both in Africa and in 
the rest of the world. In Africa it seems to connote pride and a ‘can do attitude’. This marks a 
break with the not so distant past when all the continent’s problems were blamed – with 
considerable justification, to be sure – on the European colonialists and their neo-colonialist 
successors, a blame-passing that was usually accompanied by demands that the affluent and 
powerful West should solve Africa’s problems.  
 
The phrase thus signals a new and more constructive attitude, but it is not clear whether to 
understand it as a moral admonition, a political rallying cry or an empirical statement. Does it 
mean that all African countries have a special responsibility to help in solving problems 
anywhere on the continent simply as a function of their location? Or is the phrase simply 
intended as a ‘Come on, Africa!’ cheer as when spectators are cheering their favourite 
football team? Or should it be taken to mean that African solutions to problems in Africa are 
simply more likely to succeed than those promoted by extra-continental actors and often 
imposed on African nations. 
 
In this paper, the main emphasis will be placed on the problem-solving capacity of the 
African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). As the 
AU is in the process of outsourcing responsibility to the subregional organisations on the 
continent, quite a lot will depend on the ability of the latter to form a ‘seamless web’ of 
organisations, collectively able to deal with Africa’s conflicts and other problems. This 
question has, however, been addressed in a companion report on the subregional 
organisations (Møller 2009). For both the continental and the subregional analysis, the 
theoretically based hypothesis is that quite a lot will depend on whether the organisation is 
based on shared values and ambitions and on whether it contains at least one power able to 
take the lead – often referred to as a hegemon. 
 
This paper therefore commences with a brief account of the concept of hegemony followed 
by an analysis of the empirical question whether there are any potential hegemons in Africa. 
This is followed by a rather brief analysis of the OAU’s rather dismal record with regard to 
conflicts; and then an account of the genesis of the AU, its ambitions, organisational setup 
and actual activities and accomplishments in the field of peace and security. 
 
To Have what it Takes, Walk the Walk and Talk the Talk 
The so-called ‘hegemonic stability theory’ (Keohane 1996) is inspired by Antonio Gramsci 
who was puzzled by the apparent ability of the capitalist class to co-opt (at least a strata of) 
the working class into a ‘grand coalition’ under its own leadership by convincing them that its 
own interests coincided with those of society as a whole (Gramsci 1971: 323-77; Salamani 
1981: 17, 79-80, 126-53). The concept has subsequently been applied to international 
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relations by kindred spirits from ‘critical IR theory’ such as Robert Cox, who defined 
international hegemony as ‘the formation of a coalition of top-down forces activated by a 
common consciousness in which those at the bottom are able to participate’ (Cox 1986; 
2001). The term has also been used by mainstream authors belonging to the international 
political economy tradition, such as Charles Kindleberger (Kindleberger 1981; 1986) as well 
as by international relations theorists such as Robert Keohane (Keohand 1984).  
 
One might see hegemonic stability theory as a variant of international relations realism, in 
which case the emphasis is placed on the role of power (Guzzini 1998: 142-60). Preponderant 
power allows those possessing it to coerce those who do not, but it is becoming less and less 
clear wherein power resides (Holsti 1977: 164-82; Barnett and Duvall 2005). Military power 
used to be the ultimate means of coercion, but with the gradual outlawing of war and other 
usages of military force it will have to be reserved for exceptional circumstances. Other forms 
of power tend to be more ‘fungible’, but how to weigh the different elements of power against 
each other is not at all clear. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, mentions ‘size of population and 
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and 
competence,’ referring to their totality as ‘aggregate capabilities’, yet without clarifying the 
formula for aggregation (Waltz 1979: 131; Morgenthau 1960: 110-48). 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Capabilities in Africa 
Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009. See also Clapham et al. 2006.   GDP: Gross Domestic Product, US$ billion purchasing power 
parity; MIL: Military Expenditures, US$ million; AF: Armed Forces, i.e. regular soldiers in thousands  
 
State Territory (sq km) Population GDP MIL AF State 
Territory 
(sq km) Population GDP MIL AF 
Algeria  2,381,740 34,178,188 240.20 4,270 147 Madag.  587,040 20,653,556 21.62 82 14 
Angola  1,246,700 12,799,293 114.60 2,264 107 Malawi  118,480 14,268,711 11.82 42 5 
Benin  112,620 8,791,832 13.15 55 5 Mali  1,240,000 12,666,987 14.98 157 7 
Botswana  600,370 1,990,876 29.17 317 9 Maurit. 1,030,700 3,129,486 6.31 19 16 
Burk. F. 274,200 15,746,232 19.34 95 11 Mauritius 2,040 1,284,264 15.75 27 0 
Burundi  27,830 8,988,091 3.22 78 20 Morocco  446,550 34,859,364 137.40 2,409 196 
Cameroon  475,440 18,879,301 44.03 297 14 Mozamb.  801,590 21,669,278 19.68 57 11 
Cape  V.  4,033 429,474 1.81 8 1 Namibia  825,418 2,108,665 11.59 239 9 
CAR 622,984 4,511,488 3.26 18 3 Niger  1,267,000 15,306,252 9.66 46 5 
Chad 1,284,000 10,329,208 16.26 70 25 Nigeria  923,768 149,229,090 328.10 980 80 
Comoros 2,170 752,438 0.74 - - Rwanda 26,338 10,473,282 9.06 62 33 
Cote d'Iv.  322,460 20,617,068 33.78 290 17 R. Congo 342,000 4,012,809 14.79 94 10 
Djibouti  23,000 516,055 1.93 17 10 Sahrawi 266,000 405,210 0.90 - - 
DR Congo 2,345,410 68,692,542 21.08 166 151 Sao T./P 1,001 212,679 0.28 na na 
Egypt 1,001,450 83,082,869 442.60 4640 469 Senegal  196,190 13,711,597 22.98 193 14 
Eq. Guin. 28,051 633,441 18.62 8 1 Seychelles 455 87,476 1.47 - - 
Eritrea  121,320 5,647,168 3.97 na 202 Sierra L.  71,740 6,440,053 4.42 29 11 
Ethiopia  1,127,127 85,237,338 63.44 336 138 Somalia  637,657 9,832,017 5.76 na 2 
Gabon  267,667 1,514,993 22.16 123 5 S.Africa 1,219,912 49,052,489 505.10 3,753 62 
Gambia  11,300 1,782,893 2.04 4 1 Sudan  2,505,810 41,087,825 88.95 na 109 
Ghana  239,460 23,832,495 34.52 104 14 Swazil. 17,363 1,123,913 5.71 na na 
Guinea  245,857 10,057,975 11.07 52 12 Tanzania  945,087 41,048,532 56.22 162 27 
Guin-Bis.  36,120 1,533,964 0.90 15 6 Togo  56,785 6,019,877 5.43 42 9 
Kenya  582,650 39,002,772 66.48 681 24 Tunisia 163,610 10,486,339 83.40 470 36 
Lesotho  30,355 2,130,819 3.38 40 2 Uganda  236,040 32,369,558 34.23 232 45 
Liberia  111,370 3,441,790 1.74 na na Zambia  752,614 11,862,740 17.83 247 15 
Libya  1,759,540 6,310,430 92.01 656 76 Zimb.  390,580 11,392,629 2.29 na 29 
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Moreover, what matters is surely not so much absolute as relative power, but at the regional 
level there will always be holders of power beyond the region who may bring their power to 
bear within it. Any regional balance of power may thus be tipped by an external actor, 
implying that regional hegemony can never be absolute. With this caveat in mind it still 
seems to make sense to seek to identify possible candidates for hegemony in Africa, as is 
done on Table 1, providing data for some of Waltz’s parameters.   
 
In Table 2, potential candidates for hegemony are identified as belonging to Africa’s ‘top ten’ 
in at least one relevant dimension. Excluding those excelling in only one dimension leaves us 
with twelve possible candidates. Giving the highest score to number one and calculating a 
total score for each country gives us a group of potential hegemons comprising, in that order, 
Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, the DRC, Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia and 
Libya, from which we may safely omit Morocco as a non-member of the AU.  
 
Table 2: Africa’s ‘Top Ten’ 
 
Territory Population GDP MILEX Troops Parameter 
State Rank Pct. Rank Pct. Rank Pct. Rank Pct. Rank Pct. 
Total 
Score 
Algeria 2 7.8 10 3.4 4 8.8 2 17.8 5 6.6 32
Angola 7 4.1 - - 6 4.2 5 9.5 8 4.8 18
Chad 5 4.2 - - - - - - - - -
DR Congo 3 7.7 4 6.9 - - - - 4 6.8 22
Egypt - - 3 8.3 2 16.1 1 19.4 1 21.2 37
Eritrea  - - - - - - - - 2 9.1 -
Ethiopia 10 3.7 2 8.6 - - 10 1.4 6 6.2 16
Kenya  - - 8 3.9 10 2.4 7 2.8 - - 8
Libya 4 5.8 - - 7 3.4 8 2.7 10 3.4 15
Mali 8 4.1 - - - - - - - - -
Morocco  - - 9 3.5 5 5.0 4 10.1 3 8.8 -
Niger 6 4.2 - - - - - - - - -
Nigeria  - - 1 15.0 3 12.0 6 4.1 9 3.6 25
South Africa 9 4.0 5 4.9 1 18.4 3 15.7 - - 26
Sudan 1 8.3 6 4.1 8 3.2 - - 7 4.9 22
Tanzania  - - 7 4.1 - - - - - - -
Tunisia - - - - 9 3.0 9 2.0 - - 4
 
However, as already pointed out by the ‘grand old man’ of international relations realism, 
Hans Morgenthau, and alluded to by Waltz with the terms ‘political stability and 
competence’, there are also less easily quantifiable dimensions of power (Waltz 1979: 131; 
Morgenthau 1960: 110-48). Countries torn apart by civil war such as Sudan and (at least until 
quite recently) Angola and the DRC, cannot easily exert power over others. Others such as 
Egypt may be able to play a hegemonic role, but are not particularly eager to do so as their 
main interests lie elsewhere. We are thus left with a shortlist of candidates including Algeria, 
Nigeria and South Africa followed by Ethiopia and Libya. Neither of them excels in all 
dimensions, just as none of them stands for more (usually much less) than twenty percent of 
the continental total in any dimension. 
 
In such an absence of an obvious hegemon, states may form coalitions to make up for their 
shortcomings in certain respects, implying that hegemony may be shared (Gill 1993). Single-
state hegemony is thus merely one species of the genus ‘hegemony’ alongside others, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 4
What we might call ‘proxy hegemony’ would be a delegated hegemony linking the global 
with a regional level in a semi-hierarchical way – the global hegemon delegating the exercise 
of its hegemony to a regional great power. The so-called ‘Nixon Doctrine’ thus envisioned 
outsourcing interventionary tasks around the world regions to regional great powers such as 
Iran, Nicaragua, Zaïre and (discretely) South Africa (Litwak 1984; Pauker et al. 1973). In the 
unipolar post-Cold War international system there may be similar roles to play for would-be 
regional great powers that would benefit from ‘drawing rights’ on US power in return for 
their services (Hurrell 2006).  
‘Bigemony’ (or condominium) rests on a partnership between two great powers of more or 
less equal standing. In the global economy there has thus been talk of US-German, US-
Japanese and US-EU bigemonies (Bergsten 1975; Sperling 2001; Inoguchi 1988), the latter of 
which might even be called an ‘embedded’ hegemony as the EU also has its own hegemonial 
structure. It has even been suggested that the relationship between the two superpowers in the 
final stages of the Cold War may have constituted a partial bigemony (Kanet and Kolodziej 
1991).  
 
Figure 1: Forms of Hegemony 
 
  
  
 
 
‘Trigemony’ would involve three parties, e.g. a US-Japan-EU collaborative venture as 
personified in the Trilateral Commission (Itah 1992; Sklar 1980). It might be seen as just one 
form of multilateral or group hegemony (Miller 1992; Jervis 1985), which may take the form 
of a concert system such as the post-Napoleonic ‘Concert of Europe’, where the great powers 
of the time established a modicum of order through institutionalised consultation and 
coordination (Richardson 1999). Indeed, one might view the United Nations with its five 
permanent Security Council members as an attempt at establishing such a multilateral 
hegemony (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). Another contemporary example of multilateral 
hegemony might be the G8, bringing together the economic great powers of the West around 
‘responsibilities’ vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Pentillä 2003; Bailin 2005).  
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As we shall see below, it is possible to view the genesis of the AU as the result of a bigemony 
(or perhaps trigenomy) (Adebajo  and Landsberg 2003; Landsberg 2008) and the actual 
workings of the AU as based on an ephemeral group hegemony. Such a reading may well 
offend those who uphold the norm of the ‘sovereign equality of all members’, which is also 
codified in the AU’s formal structure. However, just as in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, the 
reality may well be that ‘all [states] are equal, but some [states] are more equal than others’ 
(Orwell 1946: 133; Donnelly 2006).  
 
Hegemony is not merely a matter of ‘having what it takes’ in terms of power, but also of 
‘walking the walk’ and ‘talking the talk’, as the popular saying goes. It differs from simple 
domination by being based on consent and legitimacy and thus presupposes a certain 
commonality of values. A prospective hegemon needs to behave in a manner deemed 
acceptable by those actors whom it wishes to lead, and it has to present its own objectives and 
strategies as furthering the public good. Such an ability to persuade is not so much an 
antithesis of power, but rather an integral element in power, as argued by Michel Foucault, 
according to whom knowledge and the ability to determine what is true constitutes the very 
essence of power (Foucault 1980).   
 
This also helps explain the relationship between international regimes and hegemony (Keeley 
1990), as hegemons may be understood as ‘regime drivers’ (Young 1991; Snidal 1985), 
bringing into being regimes by codifying their own interests in the form of principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures (Krasner 1982: 186; Keohane 1982). One of the 
building blocks of a regime to which a prospective hegemon will need to pay attention is the 
formation of an ‘epistemic community’ in the sense of a network of actors sharing the same 
basic outlook and understanding (Haas 1992). This may require the hegemon to ‘talk the talk’ 
that will resonate throughout the community which it aspires to lead, and to continue to 
comply with its discursive rules.  
 
In Africa, the ideology of pan-Africanism has established itself as a Foucauldian ‘regime of 
truth’, according to which ‘Africa’ should unite. This forces leaders into a symbolic 
competition with each other, each trying to surpass the others in terms of pan-African 
credentials and necessitating a framing of  political objectives – even such as evidently point 
in the opposite direction – as incremental steps towards the pan-African ideal (Barnett 1998). 
Even though in the run-up to the creation of the OAU Kwama Nkrumah and his ‘Casablanca 
Group’ (Nkrumah 1963) with their call for immediate unity were defeated by the ‘Monrovia 
Group’ (Nyerere 1963) with its gradualist approach, emphasising the building of African 
states within the boundaries of the colonial territories, its legacy has lived on as evidenced by 
the front page of the African Union’s website, showing how the disparate pieces of an African 
puzzle come together.      
 
Not only is any aspiring hegemon compelled to talk this talk, but there is also a need to ‘walk 
the walk’ in the sense of abiding by the general rules and meeting the expectations of the 
‘junior’ members of the community. A hegemon that consistently neglects the obligations 
flowing from leadership – e.g. with regard to regime maintenance and enforcement or other 
contributions to the collective goods of the community (Kaul et al. 1999) – will soon find 
itself forced to lead through coercion rather than consent, which is simply much more 
demanding.  
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 The OAU: A Step Towards or Away from Unity? 
 
When the OAU was established in 1963 it reflected a rather fragile compromise between the 
Monrovia and Casablanca positions (Padelfort 1964). Notwithstanding the commitment in the 
preamble of the OAU Charter to ‘a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences’, 
the basic principles listed were all state rights such as ‘the sovereign equality of all member 
states’ and ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of states’ (Umozurike 1979). Not only did 
the OAU thus become a guardian of incumbent regimes (sometimes against their own 
peoples), but the implicit privileging of existing states within their pre-determined borders 
also made it impossible to deal constructively with secessionist struggles such as those of 
Biafra, Eritrea or Somaliland (Kamanu 1974; An-Na’im 1988).  
 
That states enjoyed the same rights regardless of their form of government gave dictatorships 
few incentives to democratise. In 1999, however, the OAU took a modest step away from the 
general norm of recognising whichever regime was in power by banning leaders installed by 
coups from attending its meetings (Kufour 2001), but it refrained from applying this norm 
retroactively against those incumbent heads of state or government, quite a few of whom were 
former illegitimate usurpers of state power. The OAU also failed in promoting human rights, 
notwithstanding its adoption in 1981 of an ‘African Charter on Human and People’s Rights’, 
which listed all the civil rights as well as numerous ‘second generation human rights’ 
(Mathews 1987; Welch 1994). Even though it was in 1998 decided to strengthen this human 
rights regime with the establishment of an ‘African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (G. 
Bekker  2007), this did not enter into force until 2004, after the OAU had been replaced by the 
AU. 
 
The record of the OAU was not much more impressive in the field of directly security-related 
activities. The organisation was mainly involved in setting norms and standards, but it was 
never effective in enforcing them. The most fundamental norm, codified in the OAU Charter, 
was that of the ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state’. It is, 
however, doubtful whether the significant absence of wars between African states is due to 
this norm (Touval 1967), and in the few cases of international wars (Somalia versus Ethiopia 
1977-78 and Eritrea versus Ethiopia 1998-2000) the OAU played virtually no role. The OAU 
was also committed to the principle of non-alignment, but the fact that no member state ever 
joined any formal alliance with outside powers is probably mainly due to the fact that no 
alliance memberships were ever on offer, and the OAU certainly failed in preventing the 
actual involvement of the great powers in conflicts on the continent (LeMelle 1988).  
 
Reflecting the bad experience with mercenaries – e.g. in the Congo and in Nigeria in the 
1960s (Mockler 1985) – the OAU also took steps to outlaw the use of these ‘dogs of war’, for 
example with a ‘Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism’, which has been in force 
since 1985, although this has not prevented the actual use of mercenaries and private military 
companies by states such as Sierra Leone or Angola (Musah and Fayemi 2000: 265.74; 
O’Brien 2000).  
 
Another example of OAU norm setting was the proclamation in 1996 of Africa as a nuclear-
weapons-free zone in the Pelindaba Treaty, which had by 2009 not yet entered into force. The 
fact that Africa in now free of nuclear weapons has probably much less to do with this treaty 
than with the unilateral decision by South Africa to abandon its clandestine nuclear weapons 
status, combined with the fact that no other African state (with the possible exception of 
Libya) seems to have ever so much as contemplated going nuclear (Cawthra and Moeller 
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2008). Besides this treaty, the OAU did not really venture far into the field of arms control, 
except for a rather ineffectual ‘Bamako Common African Position on Small Arms’, signed in 
2000, but with no apparent consequences (Stemmet 2001).  In 1999, the OAU further adopted 
a ‘Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism’, which entered into force in 
October 2002, committing member states to prevent their territories from being used for 
terrorist acts and to collaborate with each other in various respects (Le Sage 2007: 151-64; 
Kanu 2006: 171-6). However, the fact that Africa has not – contrary to some allegations – 
been particularly terror-ridden (Møller 2006) is not necessarily due to this convention, but 
might just as well be a consequence of the absence of worth-while targets for international 
terrorism. 
 
Besides the setting of standards, the OAU also took institutional steps to upgrade its conflict-
prevention and management capacity, such as through the creation of a ‘Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’, yet without any noteworthy consequences 
(Berman and Sams 2000: 61-8; Mwagiru 1996). The OAU on a couple of occasions also 
ventured into the field of peace support operations, as summarised in Table 3. 
  
First came the deployment of an ‘OAU Neutral Force’ in Chad in 1981-82, which was 
singularly ineffective according to most accounts (May and Massey 1998). Next came the 
deployment of two small missions to Rwanda, neither of which did anything to prevent the 
1994 genocide (Panel of Eminent Personalities 1999). After the Rwanda debacle the OAU 
fielded Observer Missions in Burundi (1993-96) and in Comoros (1997-99) as well as an 
OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea, none of which seem to have made much of a 
difference (Khadiagala 2003). Its lofty ambitions notwithstanding, the OAU thus did just as 
little with regard to the security of its members as it did in terms of forging any real unity 
among them. The best explanation may be that nobody really tried, which in turn may be 
explained by the absence of any hegemon able and willing to play a leading role.   
 
Table 3: OAU Peacekeeping Missions 
Source: Berman and Sams 2000: 47-74; Cleaver and May 1998. 
MOT: Military Observer Team; NMOG: Neutral Military Observer group ; OMIB: Observer Mission in Burundi; OMIC: 
Observer Mission in the Comoros 
 
Contributors Country Name Time Troops Observers 
Chad Neutral Force 1981-82 Nigeria, Senegal Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Zambia 
MOT 1990-91  Burkina Faso, Uganda, Zaïre 
NMOG-I 1991-92  Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe 
 
Rwanda 
NMOG-II 1992-93 Tunisia Cameroon, Rep. of Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Tunisia 
Burundi OMIB 1993-96  Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, 
Niger, Tunisia 
Comoros OMIC 1997-99  Egypt, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia 
 
 
From  OAU to AU:  Meeting of Minds or Quids and Quos? 
The years from 1999 to 2002 saw a gradual transformation of the OAU into what is now the 
African Union (AU) (Mwanasali 2003), a process which might best be understood as a 
convergence or fusion of three projects, namely a Libyan quest for pan-African unity, a 
Nigerian project for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
Africa (CSSDCA), and a South African project for an African Renaissance (Tieku 2004).  
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First, and apparently driving the transformation, was a grandiose and utterly unrealistic pan-
African scheme of the Libyan dictator Gadaffi, who ensured the decision in 1999 to create ‘a 
larger community of peoples transcending cultural, ideological, ethnic and national 
differences’ (see Ronen 2002). However, the flamboyant Libyan leader could not have made 
his plans fly without the support of Nigeria and South Africa, each of which had their ‘pet 
projects’ for which they wanted an all-African stamp of approval, in return for which they 
gave their support for the new union.  
 
The Nigeria idea of a CSSDCA came out of the so-called ‘Kampala Movement’ (Deng and 
Zartman 2002), and was envisioned as a counterpart of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Møller 2008). The vision was formulated in the 1991 
‘Kampala Document’, which, inter alia, envisioned  a modification of  the principle of 
sovereignty in favour of a shared African responsibility to protect human rights (Deng and 
Zartman 2002: 117-9). However, the initiative then remained dormant until 1999 when it was 
resurrected from near oblivion by President Obasanjo and formally endorsed by the OAU in 
2000.  The CSSDCA was based on a very broad concept of security, including human 
security, and acknowledged good governance as a pre-requisite of stable peace. As a means to 
realise these values, it envisaged ‘a collective continental architecture for promoting security 
and inter-African relations’, and recommended the signing of non-aggression pacts, a 
common defence policy for Africa, stand-by arrangement for peace support operations, police 
collaboration, the establishment of an early warning mechanism as well as a strengthening of 
confidence-building measures. Most of these recommendations were formally confirmed at 
the inaugural AU summit in Durban in 2002. 
 
South Africa’s pet project was what has now become known as NEPAD (New Economic 
Partnership for Africa’s Development). Based on the vision of an African Renaissance, it was 
first called the ‘New Africa Initiative’, dating back to the OAU summit in 1999, at which 
president Mbeki of South Africa and Algerian president Bouteflika were mandated to 
negotiate debt cancellation for Africa.  This duo was subsequently expanded to a troika with 
president Obasanjo of Nigeria, and what was now called the ‘Millennium Partnership for the 
African Recovery Programme’ (MAP) was endorsed by the OAU in 2001.  MAP was 
subsequently merged with the so-called OMEGA Plan, launched by Senegalese President 
Wade, to become NEPAD (Kouassi 2007; Breytenbach 2002; Bunwaree 2008). The main 
objectives are poverty eradication and sustainable development, but as a precondition for such 
development it also featured a ‘Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance 
Initiative’. Since then, however, NEPAD has not really focused much on conflicts or security, 
but its security agenda has been ‘mainstreamed’ within the AU by being subsumed under the 
prerogatives of the Peace and Security Council to which we shall soon turn. 
 
A grand bargain had thus been struck between the ‘neo-Casablancans’, personified by the 
grandiose and populist Gadaffi, and the pragmatic ‘neo-Monrovians’, personified by 
Obasanjo and Mbeki: that is, three of the continent’s potential hegemons. This cleared the 
path to the launch of a new organisation. Following a hectic drafting process the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union (CAAU) was signed by 53 African heads of state in July 2000 
(Maluwa 2003). This allowed for the solemn proclamation of the AU at an extraordinary 
Summit of the OAU in March 2001, and its solemn inauguration at a summit in Durban, 9-10 
July 2002 (Cilliers 2002a; 2002b). Marking a break with the OAU past, this summit refused 
recognition to the regime in Madagascar because of its unconstitutional basis, in conformity 
with decisions taken in Lomé in 2000.  
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The AU:  Departures from Sacrosanct Sovereignty 
The preamble of the CAAU paid tribute to pan-Africanism with the claim that it was ‘guided 
by our common vision of a united and strong Africa’. More importantly it made a significant 
departure from the past by establishing the right of the Union to intervene in domestic affairs 
of member states in cases of ‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’, based 
merely on a decision taken by the Assembly with a two-thirds majority (Murithi 2007; 
Mwanasali 2008; Williams 2007). The list of triggering events was subsequently expanded to 
include ‘serious threats to legitimate order’, probably referring to military coups or other 
attempts at overthrowing a legitimate government (Baimu and Sturman 2003; Kuwali 2008).  
 
Even with the original formulation, the AU was way ahead of the rest of the international 
community, where there has for some years been a debate on the responsibility to protect, 
often referred to as ‘R2P’ (ICISS 2001). Since no binding decisions have, however, been 
taken in this respect the UN Charter’s article 2.7 remains in force, according to which not 
even the UN Security Council (much less anybody else) is allowed to interfere in internal 
affairs except in cases of threats to international peace and security. Moreover, the UN 
Charter explicitly confines the role of regional organisations to ‘the pacific settlement of local 
disputes’ as well as ‘enforcement action’ under Security Council authorisation. Should the 
AU decide to take action under CAAU in the form of a humanitarian intervention without a 
UN Security Council mandate, it would thus be illegal under international law, no matter how 
legitimate it would be. 
 
The CAAU further underlined the need to ‘defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of its Member States’, as a means to which end it ambitiously envisaged ‘the 
establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent’. While the former, at 
first glance, seems tantamount to a collective security provision, it may in fact have been 
intended as a collective defence clause – the distinction between the two being that the latter 
is merely intended for defence against external aggression, whereas the former should also 
protect each member against attack from other members (Wallander and Keohand 1999; 
Touray 2005).  
 
Greater clarity was achieved with the ‘Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence 
and Security Policy’ (CADSP) adopted in 2004, and the ‘African Union Non-Aggression and 
Common Defence Pact’ (AUNACDP) of 2005. The latter committed members to assist each 
other in cases of ‘aggression’, which seems quite in line with the UN Charter’s endorsement 
of the ‘inherent right of individual and collective self-defence’, albeit only ‘until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’. However, 
not only is the AUNACPD mute about the UN’s supreme authority, but it also has a more 
permissive definition of the ‘triggering events’. Whereas the UN Charter only mentions 
‘attack’, the AU Pact refers to ‘acts of aggression’, to which category it counts ‘provision of 
any support to armed groups, mercenaries and other organized trans-national criminal groups 
which may carry out hostile acts against a member state’. For the AU to take action according 
to this definition of attack may thus represent a legal problem, unless the UN explicitly 
endorses its interpretation. Of course, the AU is not alone in wanting a more expansive and 
flexible definition of attack or aggression, and if the meanings of attack and self-defence are 
already under revision it makes perfect sense for the AU to expand the former to include 
‘attacks by proxy’, as this is clearly a major threat to several African states (Prunier 2004). 
 
Whereas the AU may be treading on rather thin legal ice with regard to its collective defence 
ambitions, it is obviously entitled to engage in all those ‘soft’ and non-military tasks related to 
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conflict prevention and peace making that are explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter. Nor are 
there any legal problems with regard to its deployment of peacekeeping operations, which is 
also quite in line with the ‘spirit’ of Chapter VIII, even though they are not mentioned, simply 
because these ‘chapter six-and-a-half operations’ had not yet been invented in 1945 (Gomes 
2008; Adebajo 2008; . Murithi  2008; De Waal 2009). To date the AU has fielded three such 
operations. 
 
Both NEPAD and the CSSDCA were based on quite a comprehensive concept of security 
including ‘human security’ – i.e. the security of individuals. Indeed the aforementioned ‘R2P’ 
clause in the CAAU was mainly intended for furthering human security. While it is hard to 
find explicit commitments by the AU to human security, the theme is quite pervasive (Tieku 
2007; Dersso 2008), and the organisation has clearly addressed a number of issues usually 
referred to as elements of human security. In the field of human rights it has both 
implemented decisions taken by the OAU (e.g. with regard to the Protocol on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights) (O. Bekker 2007) and taken new initiatives – partly under the auspices of  
NEPAD – inter alia with regard to the rights of women and children, the plight of refugees 
and internally displaced persons, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, etcetera (Lloyd and Murray 2004; 
Okafor 2004). Among the most significant ambitions is that of promoting democracy, which, 
according to the fashionable theories about the ‘democratic peace,’ holds the promise of 
providing reliable safeguards against war. The main problem with this theory or strategy is, 
however, that states in a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy seem to be at least as 
war-prone as unreformed non-democracies (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Moreover, it is not 
obvious that there is much the AU (or any other external actor) can do to promote democracy. 
If there was it would certainly be worthwhile doing even if it does not really ensure 
international peace, as democracy has many other attractive qualities, probably including that 
of making intra-state armed conflicts less likely.   
 
The AU has indeed taken several steps with regard to democracy promotion, including the 
adoption in 2007 of an ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’, which 
explicitly referred to the causal link between unconstitutional changes of government and 
‘insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa’. Not only did the charter confirm the 
general norms of multi-party democracy, separation of powers and the rule of law etcetera, 
but it also made it mandatory to invite observers to elections. With regard to ‘unconstitutional 
changes of government’, it specified mandatory penalties for illegitimate usurpers of power, 
including immediate suspension from AU activities. The usurpers would furthermore be 
banned from running in future elections and from holding ‘any position of responsibility in 
political institutions of their State’, and they could be tried before ‘the competent court of the 
Union’. Other states were not only prohibited from supporting unconstitutional changes of 
government, but also from offering asylum to the usurpers (Kane 2008).  
 
There is little doubt that the above significant departures of the AU from the OAU’s 
guardianship of the existing states with their incumbent regimes were promoted by the 
continent’s great powers, mainly South Africa and Nigeria – skilfully managing to 
rhetorically outmanoeuvre the obstinate defenders of the former principles of sovereignty and 
non-interference such as Libya and its allies. One explanation for the success of the two ‘neo-
Monrovians’ may have been their ability to frame their favoured policies in the discursive 
garments of pan-Africanism, thus ‘out-casablancking the neo-Casablancans’.     
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Organisational Setup: Work in Progress 
In order to realise the lofty goals set out above an effective organisation is surely required, 
and the CAAU did indeed envisage quite an elaborate organisational setup, to which 
subsequent summit meetings have added new institutions. One should, however, not place too 
much emphasis on the organisational setup, as what matters is the political will to do what is 
needed. If the will is there, states will find a way around organisational obstacles, but if it is 
lacking, even the best organisational setup with the most binding commitments will be of 
little help. Moreover, organigrams such as that in Figure 2 are often misleading, both because 
they give no real indication of what matters and what does not, and because they are 
inevitably snapshots of a moving target. 
 
It is immediately apparent that the AU features an embryonic sub-division into a legislature, 
an executive and a judiciary. The legislature is represented by the Assembly and to some 
extent the Pan-African Parliament, whereas the closest approximation to an executive is the 
Commission, most recently renamed ‘Authority’. As far as the judiciary is concerned, this is 
represented by two courts, now about to be merged into one with two separate chambers: the 
African Court of Justice and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Organigram of the African Union (simplified) 
Source: http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/ 
 
The supreme authority within the AU is the Assembly: the summits of heads of state and 
government of all member states. These were initially held annually, but are now more 
frequent, in addition to which several extraordinary summits have taken place. The Executive 
Council comprises the foreign ministers of member states and is in charge of preparing the 
summits, while the Permanent Representatives Committee deals with day-to-day matters.  In 
the Assembly, there is a quorum requirement of two-thirds of the member states. According 
to the Rules of Procedure adopted in 2002 all decisions are taken by consensus, which is 
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immediately qualified by the clause ‘or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the 
member states eligible to vote’.  
 
The Assembly appoints the Commission for a four-year term, which is only renewable once, 
and it may sack any member of the Commission with a two-thirds majority. Even though 
there are rules about the distribution of commissionerships among member states, the 
members of the Commission are supposed to serve only the AU rather than their home states. 
Even though these arrangements seem to mirror those of the EU, there may be less to this 
resemblance than meets the eye. Whereas in the EU the Commission is actually the 
embodiment of supranationality and holds considerable power, the AU’s Commission is a lot 
weaker. In a certain sense the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is also supposed to represent the 
community, holding the Commission democratically accountable. However, whereas the 
European Parliament is directly elected, its African counterpart is not (Magliveras and Naldi 
2003), and it is only envisioned to have ‘consultancy and advisory powers’. The formula for 
representation in the PAP was also a far cry from an equitable representation of the peoples of 
the continent, assigning five seats to each member state, large or small.  Within these 
constraints, the PAP seems to have been working quite well since its inauguration. Perhaps 
fortunately, Midrand, South Africa, has been designated as its permanent seat, and the host 
country has taken it quite seriously and devoted considerable resources to it (Mbete 2008). 
Among other activities, the PAP has dispatched election observers to several elections in 
member states. Another envisaged vehicle for popular participation in the AU is the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the 150 members of which are 
appointed by civil society groups (Sturman and Cilliers 2003; Assogbavi 2008; Mutasa 2008). 
It has merely advisory and consultative functions, the significance of which seems rather 
dubious. 
 
Besides the envisioned contributions of both PAP and ECOSOCC to human rights in Africa, 
the AU has also established both a commission and a court devoted to these rights. Both refer 
to ‘human and peoples’ rights’, echoing the long-standing dispute in the international 
community over individual and collective human rights. Whereas the West has focused 
exclusively on individual and civil rights, African and other Third World states have 
consistently argued for an inclusion of both individual economic and social rights and 
collective human rights (Jones 1999; Kiwanuka 1988).  The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) is mandated to collect data and offer advice for how to 
implement the general principles in the national legislation of member states. The African 
Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights has now been inaugurated and judges have been 
appointed, but no actual court cases had yet been conducted by the end of 2008 (Bekker 
2007a; Lloyd and Murray 2004; Motala 2008). 
 
Besides these general institutions, the AU also features institutions specifically devoted to 
dealing with armed conflict and security issues (Franke 2008; Klingenbiehl 2005; Bogland et 
al. 2008), but quite a lot of this remains ‘work in progress’. At a 2002 summit it was agreed to 
establish a Peace and Security Council (PSC) to deal with ‘conflict prevention, peace-making, 
peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction’ (AU 2002). The PSC is the highest authority within the AU on peace and 
security-related matters (Cilliers and Sturman 2004). Even though its structure is clearly 
inspired by the UN Security Council (the supreme authority of which is explicitly 
acknowledged) it has neither permanent members nor veto rights, but all its fifteen members 
are elected, ten of them for a two-year term and five for a three-year term. Even though 
election should take into account geographical representativity and rotation, membership of 
 13
the Council should also entail obligations in terms of payment of dues and contributions to the 
operations and the Peace Fund set up to fund them.  
 
While this seems more democratic and fair than the UN arrangement, it does not 
automatically ensure the potential hegemons an influence commensurate with their capacities, 
which may bode ill for the future. If states such as Nigeria or South Africa should happen not 
to be elected members of the PSC, they just might retaliate by keeping their substantial 
contributions to, for instance, peacekeeping operations to the prescribed minimum, which 
would have severe detrimental consequences for such missions that tend to depend very much 
on their ‘excess contributions’.    
 
Besides functions taken over from the OAU’s ‘Mechanism’,  the PSC is charged with 
developing the aforementioned common defence policy for the Union (Touray 2005). A 
‘Draft Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy’ was formulated and 
at an extraordinary AU Assembly in 2004 a ‘Solemn Declaration’ on the same topic was 
announced in which the states acknowledged the need for: 
‘a definition of defence which encompasses both the traditional, military and 
state-centric notion of the use of the armed forces of the state to protect its 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less traditional, non-
military aspects which relate to the protection of the people’s political, cultural, 
social and economic values and ways of life.’  
The main emphasis was placed on internal threats such as intra-state war and genocide, and 
the intention was articulated to enhance Africa’s capacity for peacekeeping and similar 
missions. There seems to be a certain inspiration from the European Union, where such tasks 
are usually referred to as ‘Petersberg Tasks’ (Western European Union 2002), but the AU is 
more ambitious than its European counterpart by also envisaging humanitarian interventions 
in which the PSC could also play a pro-active role by making proposals to the Assembly. The 
PSC is further responsible for the collaboration with the subregional organisations (Møller 
2009). In its various activities the PSC  is supported by a ‘Panel of the Wise’, appointed by 
the AU Assembly, consisting of ‘five highly respected African personalities’ who are not 
merely expected to advise the PSC, but also to undertake fact-finding missions, conduct 
shuttle diplomacy and mediate in formal and informal negotiations (Nathan 2004). 
 
The AU Commission is also involved in conflict and security-related activities, with a special 
department devoted to this, the Peace and Security Directorate. For its structure see the 
organigram in Figure 3, showing also how both the PSC and the Commission operate under 
the overall authority of the Assembly and how the Secretariat of the department is responsible 
for servicing the PSC.  
 
Under the auspices of the department a Continental Early Warning System is being 
established (Cilliers 2005). Even though it was not yet, by the time of writing, operational, a 
major study on the topic had been prepared, which certainly testifies to the sincerity of the 
commitment (Conflict Management Division 2008; Wulf and Debiel 2009).  The department 
is also in charge of the preparations for the African Stand-by Force (ASF), which is scheduled 
to be operational by 2010. It is to be ‘composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, 
with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid 
deployment at appropriate notice’. As a step towards this, a Military Staff Committee is to be 
established and a certain standardisation of equipment as well as doctrines is to be undertaken 
(Kent and Mala 2003; Malan 2004; Motuni 2004; Neetling 2005; Marshall 2009). 
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Figure 3: AU Commission Structure for Peace and Security 
Source: based on Langinvainio and Reyes 2006; 10-11; Bogland et al. 2008. 
 
 
Peacekeeping Missions 
Rather than being able to wait until all of the above forces, mechanisms, etcetera were in 
place, the AU had the task of sending peacekeeping missions thrust upon it unprepared (see 
Table 4). 
 
Table 4: African Union Peacekeeping Missions 
Source: Feldrman 2008 
AMIB: African Union Mission in Burundi; AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan; AMISOM: African Union Mission in 
Somalia; UNAMID: UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur  
 
Contributors Location Acronym Period 
Main  Others 
Burundi AMIB April 2003-June 
2004 
  
South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, 
 Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, 
Togo, Tunisia 
AMIS June 2004-Dec. 
2007 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, 
South Africa, Senegal, 
Ghana, Gambia, Kenya 
Mauritania, Niger, Mali,  
Burkina-Faso,  Zambia, 
Lesotho, Uganda,  
Madagascar, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Mauritius,  
Sudan 
(Darfur) 
UNAMID Jan 2008-present Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, South Africa, 
Senegal, Ghana, Gambia, 
Kenya 
Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, 
Nepal, Pakistan and others 
Somalia AMISOM Jan. 2007-present Uganda, Burundi None 
 
Following in the footsteps of the OAU, the AU assumed responsibility for overseeing the 
peace process in Burundi (Bentley and Southhall 2005). Following the signing of a peace 
agreement, in April 2003 the AU dispatched a peacekeeping mission, AMIB, tasked with VIP 
protection and disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of combatants. These tasks 
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seem to have been implemented successfully by the three countries contributing more than 
3,000 troops (South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique) and a number of other countries 
providing civilian staff (Svensson 2008). By June 2004 the mission was replaced by a UN 
mission.  
 
When a civil war broke out in 2003 in Darfur, the AU quickly became involved, initially in 
the role as mediator (Toga 2007; Nathan 2007). Following the signature in 2004 of a very 
fragile and contested ‘humanitarian ceasefire’ between the government and some of the 
Darfurian rebel groups the AU dispatched observers and a small troop contingent (‘AMIS-1’) 
to monitor the agreement, which was later the same year expanded to a full-fledged 
peacekeeping mission, AMIS-2, which was gradually expanded to 596 military observers, 
5,210 troops and 1,425 police officers. Whereas they were unable to stop the killings or the 
forced displacement of civilians, the AMIS probably did as well as anybody else would have 
– and with a casualty toll of almost sixty troops killed (Williams 2006). By the end of 2007 it 
was folded into an unprecedented hybrid mission, UNAMID (United Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur), which by February 2009 numbered 12,421 troops and 2,510 police 
officers plus civilian staff, of which (as was perhaps to be expected) the overwhelming 
majority were Africans.  The largest contributors are listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Contributors to UNAMID (as of February 2009) 
Source: Kreps 2007; Othieno and Samasuwo 2007. 
 
Country Troops Police Mil Obs Total Country Troops Police 
Mil. 
Obs Total 
Nigeria 3,337 547 11 3,895 Top 5  Other     
Rwanda 3,236 37 7 3,280 Bangladesh 378 227 5 610 
Ethiopia 1,469 9 12 1,490 China 324 0 0 324 
Egypt 1,390 3 12 1,405 Indonesia 4 143 2 149 
South Africa 625 157 13 795 Nepal 26 252 12 290 
Senegal 667 35 17 719 Pakistan 508 96 2 606 
Ghana 10 489 3 502 Total 1,240 718 21 1,979 
Gambia 201 15 2 218 Others 63 134 13 210 
Zambia 13 101 10 124 Grand Total 12,408 2,476 186 15,070 
Kenya 85 0 0 85      
Other Africa 72 231 65 368 
Total Africa 11,105 1,624 152 12,881 
Africa’s  
Share 89% 66% 82% 85% 
 
The third AU deployment was to Somalia (African Union Mission to Somalia, AMISOM) in 
2007 following the Ethiopian invasion of this country, and was intended to replace the 
Ethiopian troops by protecting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). By early 2009, 
when the Ethiopian forces were withdrawn, only Uganda and Burundi had deployed a total of 
3,750 troops. The casualty numbers were quite high, the accomplishments minuscule and the 
future of the mission very uncertain (Baker 2007). 
 
Both the AU as such and its membership have thus acquired considerable experience, for 
good and bad, from peacekeeping missions. One of the lessons to be drawn from the above 
missions seems to be that African missions rely quite heavily on the commitment of ‘lead 
nations’ such as South Africa or Nigeria (Kagwanja 2006), and that foreign assistance, not 
least with regard to transport capacity, remains urgently needed. 
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Conclusion: African Solutions to African Problems? 
No matter how popular the phrase ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ may be, it is 
neither obvious that ‘Africa’ could nor should solve all the continent’s problems.  
 
The ambitions of the African Union, the various sub-regional organisations on the continent 
and the national leaders are obvious and the determination to strive for their realisation seems 
sincere, at least in most cases. However, that there is a wide gap between these ambitions, 
plans, organisational setups etcetera and the actual accomplishments should come as no great 
surprise. It would be surprising if the world’s poorest continent were able to solve the world’s 
most frequent and widespread as well as most deadly conflicts. However, this neither means 
that the endeavour is completely futile nor that it should not be undertaken. Both the AU and 
the subregional organisations have actually succeeded in bringing at least relative peace to 
countries such as Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan (with the significant exception of 
Darfur) in situations where the rest of the ‘global community’ procrastinated. 
 
It does not seem ethically justifiable to vest all African countries with special responsibilities 
for helping solve conflicts anywhere on the continent – usually conflicts for which the rest of 
the continent’s 53 states cannot possibly be blamed – but that the Africans accept this 
responsibility can only be applauded as heroic. The main problem with the phrase may thus 
be that it all too conveniently lets the West ‘off the hook’. 
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